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A Threshold of Significant Harm (F)or A Viable Alternative Therapeutic Option? 
 
Abstract 
This article critically examines the legal arguments presented on behalf of Charlie 
Gard’s parents, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, based upon a threshold test of 
significant harm for intervention into the decisions made jointly by holders of parental 
responsibility. It argues that the legal basis of the argument, from the case of Ashya 
King, was tenuous. It sought to introduce different categories of cases concerning 
children’s medical treatment when, despite the inevitable factual distinctions between 
individual cases, the duty of the judge in all cases to determine the best interests of 
the child is firmly established by the case law.  It argues that the focus should not have 
been upon a threshold for intervention but upon whether his parents had established 
that the therapy they wanted was a viable alternative therapeutic option. In the April 
hearing, Charlie’s parents relied upon the offer of treatment from a US doctor, by July 
they had an independent panel of international experts supporting their case although 
by this time the medical evidence was that it was too late for Charlie. One of Charlie’s 
legacies for future disputes may be that his case highlighted the need for evidence as 
to whether the treatment parents want for their child is a viable alternative therapeutic 
option before a court can determine which therapeutic option is in the best interests of 
the child.     
 
Introduction 
This article undertakes a critical analysis of the legal arguments presented on behalf 
of the parents of Charlie Gard, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, in their attempt to 
persuade the appeal courts to overturn the declarations made by Francis J upon 
application by Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH).i Given the simplicity and clarity 
of the law, set out and applied in the judgment of Francis J,ii and the discretion it 
extends to a judge to determine the best interests of the child, it was necessary for 
Counsel for Charlie’s parents to try to distinguish Charlie’s case from all the others in 
which a court has been asked to authorise the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from a child and, from there, to argue that the law as applied to 
Charlie’s situation should be different. In the Court of Appeal, Counsel sought to 
bracket Charlie’s case with King, interpreting that as a case in which parental 
preference prevailed, and in which Baker J had said,   
 
‘the State – whether it be the court, or any other public authority – has no 
business interfering with the exercise of parental responsibility unless the child 
is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the care given to 
the child not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.’iii  
 
Drawing upon this, the parents’ first ground of appeal was that where both parents are 
agreed, in the exercise of their parental responsibility, to the administration of a viable 
alternative therapeutic option offered by a doctor, in the exercise of his or her 
professional opinion, parental preference should be followed except in those cases 
where it was likely to cause the child significant harm.  In his leading judgment, 
dismissing the appeal, McFarlane LJ concluded that the authorities demonstrated that 
there was no ‘factor or filter’ before the court evaluates the best interests of the child.iv 
Furthermore, that as Francis J had found that administration of nucleoside therapy 
would be futile, be of no benefit and merely prolong Charlie’s ‘awful existence’, there 
                                                 
i  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410. 
ii  GOSH v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972, [39]-[41]. 
iii  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964, [31]. 
iv  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [94]. 
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was no viable alternative before the court.v Finally, although it had not been addressed 
in the court below, McFarlane LJ concluded that had the judge been invited to find 
whether Charlie was currently suffering significant harm he would have so concludedvi 
and, it followed, significant harm would result from the continuation of ventilation and 
Charlie’s life in order to administer nucleoside therapy.vii Thus, the judge concluded 
that the submissions had no foundation in law, were contrary to established principle 
and could not be supported on the facts.   
 
The second ground of appeal, also dismissed, was that the application by GOSH to 
prevent another providing treatment in the reasonable exercise of their professional 
judgement was beyond the powers of the hospital as a public authority and in the 
absence of significant harm outside the court’s jurisdiction.viii The argument was that 
whilst the Trust could apply to court and the court could make a declaration that it was 
lawful for the hospital not to provide nucleoside therapy, it could not seek by way of a 
court order to prevent the parents from taking up the offer of treatment elsewhere. The 
Court of Appeal preferred the submission of Ms Gollop QC for GOSH that the issue 
had arisen between the parents and the clinicians which the Trust had properly brought 
before the court for a judge to decide according to the best interests of the child.ix  
 
In this article, it is argued that the legal basis for the arguments grounded in the earlier 
case of Ashya King was tenuous. It sought to introduce different categories of cases 
concerning children’s medical treatment into the law when, despite the inevitable 
factual distinctions between individual cases, the duty of the judge in all cases to 
determine the best interests of the child is firmly established by the case law. However, 
consideration of the cases of King and Gard together reveal the need for parents to 
secure evidence that what they want is a viable alternative therapeutic option before 
the court can determine which option is in the best interests of the child.  To develop 
that argument this article critically examines the arguments taking each of the 
conclusions of McFarlane LJ in the Court of Appeal in turn. 
 
No ‘factor or filter’ before the court considers best interests 
The Children Act 1989 places primary responsibility for the welfare of children with 
their parents, including the responsibility to make decisions as to the medical treatment 
their child will receive from the options available, according to their judgement of the 
best interests of the child.(4)   If disagreement between parents and clinicians about a 
child’s medical treatment cannot be resolved, the matter must be referred to court by 
a party with an interest in the issue.(5)  The test applied by the judge is the ‘well being, 
welfare or best interests’(6) of the child. 
 
In submissions to the Court of Appeal two previous cases were noted when, it was 
argued, there had been an attempt to ‘establish bespoke sub-categories, to which a 
different test might apply’,x Re J (1991) (7) and Re T (1997).(8) As is apparent from 
the dates of these two cases both were early in the jurisprudence of the court on 
children’s medical treatment. Re J (1991)(7) concerned an application to withhold 
ventilation from a child whilst the court in Re T (1997) was asked to override parental 
refusal of consent to a liver transplant operation for their child. In the first, Counsel for 
the Official Solicitor submitted that the principle of the sanctity of life meant that a court 
                                                 
v  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [97]. 
vi  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [114]. 
vii  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [115]. 
viii  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [84]. 
ix  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [88], [117]. 
x  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [79], referring to the submission 
of Ms Butler-Cole for the Guardian.  
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is ‘never justified in withholding consent to treatment which could enable a child to 
survive a life-threatening condition’ or, in the alternative, submitted that the court could 
sanction the withholding of life-saving treatment only where the child’s life would 
demonstrably be intolerable. Their Lordships restated the law that, in wardship cases, 
the paramount consideration is the best interests of the child in determination of which 
there is a ‘very strong presumption in favour of a course of action which will prolong 
life’ but that ‘intolerability’ was not, as had been submitted to the court, ‘a quasi-
statutory yardstick.’xi   
 
In one of the few cases in which the parental appeal succeeded on both point of law 
and in overturning the decision of the first instance judge, the Court of Appeal in Re T 
held that the judge had been wrong to ask whether the decision of the child’s parents 
was reasonable.  On behalf of the parents, Mr Francis QC (who was the judge in the 
Charlie Gard case) challenged the judge’s conclusion that the parents’ refusal of 
consent to the transplant was unreasonable and submitted that ‘where the welfare of 
a child required a family decision that decision if reasonable ought to be respected and 
the inherent jurisdiction of the court ought not to be exercised to overrule it.’xii Rejecting 
that submission, Butler-Sloss LJ explained that it was clearly established that in an 
application under the court’s inherent jurisdiction the welfare of the child is 
paramount.xiii On both occasions the Court of Appeal affirmed the best interests test.   
 
The quote from the judgment of Baker J in King relied upon by Counsel and quoted 
above was the third legal principle the judge stated that he must apply. The first and 
most important was that ‘Ashya’s welfare is my paramount consideration’,xiv the second 
was to have regard to Ashya’s human rights under Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right 
to respect for a private and family life) of the European Convention of Human Rights.xv 
Baker J did not consider whether the treatment preference of Ashya’s parents would 
cause him to suffer significant harm. The judge decided that it was in Ashya’s best 
interests to be provided with the medical treatment his parents proposed in a ‘coherent 
and reasonable’ treatment plan and for which they had funding and transport. Their 
plan was not opposed by his doctors, CAFCASS or the local authority so there was no 
reason for the judge to oppose the plan.xvi The King case did not establish different a 
category of case and therefore offered a tenuous basis for the development of one 
based upon a threshold of significant harm where parents have identified an alternative 
treatment option. Whilst the individual facts of cases will invariably differ and they could 
be brought together in broad groupings, in terms of the law there are no distinct 
categories of cases. Forty years of case law has established that, without exception, 
decisions made by the courts on behalf of children are made according to the principle 
of the best interests of the child. But a decision about what is best for the child 
necessarily requires options from which to choose.     
 
Evidence of a Viable Alternative Therapy? 
At the hearing in April, the first question for Francis J was whether it was in Charlie’s 
best interests to undergo a trial of nucleoside bypass therapy. A recognised expert 
in the field was offering what Charlie’s parents believed was a viable alternative to 
the withdrawal of ventilation and provision of palliative care which the clinicians at 
GOSH considered to be in Charlie’s best interests. However, at that time, the 
weight of evidence before the judge from the GOSH clinicians, second opinions and 
                                                 
xi  Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] Fam 33, 46. 
xii  Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 248.  
xiii  Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 250.  
xiv  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964, [29]. 
xv  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964, [30]. 
xvi  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964, [33], [34]. 
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the consultant instructed by the family was that, given the deterioration in Charlie’s 
condition caused by the seizures he had suffered from January, the therapy was futile. 
Against this stood the view of Professor Hirano who considered there to be a 
theoretical possibility that the therapy would be effective in Charlie’s condition and 
might make a modest difference to his life expectancy.xvii Charlie’s parents could not 
understand why they were prevented from accepting the offer of treatment from an 
expert made in the exercise of his professional judgement. At that point, Francis J 
observed, Professor Hirano had been given access to Charlie’s medical notes but had 
not examined Charlie. As Francis J explained in his July judgment, ‘[i]t seems to me to 
be a remarkably simple proposition that if a doctor is to give evidence to this court 
about the prospect of effective treatment in respect of a child whose future is being 
considered by the court, that Dr should see the patient before the court can sensibly 
rely upon his evidence.’(9)  In July, Charlie’s parents asked GOSH to return to court 
for consideration of new evidence from an independent panel of international experts, 
including two who had examined Charlie and remained willing to treat him.xviii A full 
body MRI performed at this time revealed the extent to which he had suffered 
irreversible muscle atrophy. As Charlie’s parents observed ‘when on the verge of being 
able to satisfy this Court (by new evidence and/or a new appreciation of existing 
evidence) that treatment was in Charlie’s best interests’ ‘[f]or Charlie, it is now too 
late.xix  In April, Francis J’s conclusion that trial of the therapy was not in Charlie’s best 
interests was inevitable given the lack of evidence that it was a viable alternative 
therapeutic option. There was no doubt that Professor Hirano was an expert in the field 
but his opinion was theoretical rather than a professional opinion that the therapy would 
be effective in the treatment of Charlie. Had Charlie’s parents amassed by April the 
evidence they had three months later, they may well have been able to demonstrate 
that nucleoside therapy was a viable alternative therapeutic option. Best interests is, 
as is well known, wider than the clinical interests and the judge could still have decided 
that it was not in Charlie’s best interests to undergo a trial of the therapy. But if the 
court does not have before it evidence that what the parents want is a viable alternative 
therapeutic option for their child, it cannot be an option from which the court can select 
in deciding upon the best interests of the child.          
 
Was Charlie Suffering Significant Harm? 
McFarlane LJ concluded that Charlie would suffer significant harm from a trial of the 
therapy given the conclusion of Francis J ‘that it would be of no benefit for Charlie and 
that he would need to continue with the regime of life-sustaining treatment, which the 
judge concluded was not otherwise in his best interests, so that the nucleoside therapy 
could be administered.’xx In the Court of Appeal, the judge inevitably drew from 
conclusions reached in the court below in which there had been no submissions on a 
threshold of significant harm, according to the existing legal framework, about Charlie’s 
best interests. There was little consideration in the submissions to the Court of Appeal 
as to how a threshold of significant harm would apply in the context of the medical 
treatment of a child generally or specifically of a terminally ill child requiring artificial 
ventilation to sustain life whose parents wished him to receive innovative therapy.xxi  
                                                 
xvii  GOSH v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972, [101], [106]. 
xviii  Position statement on behalf of the parents, 24th & 25th July, [4]-[8], 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 
23/01/18]. 
xix  Position statement on behalf of the parents, 24th & 25th July, [31], [18], 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 
23/01/18]. 
xx  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [115].  
xxi  Joe Brierley and Vic Larcher defined innovative therapy as ‘any newly introduced 
treatment, or a new modification to an existing therapy with unproven efficacy and side 
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Giles Birchley has critically examined the literature which advocates for a harm 
principle as the appropriate threshold for state intervention in parental decisions about 
their child’s medical treatment.(12) For example, considering parental refusal of 
recommended medical treatment, Douglas Diekema argued that the relevant question 
is not whether the treatment refused is in the best interests of the child but whether 
‘the decision of a parent places the child at substantial risk of serious harm.(13) But, 
he does not define what he understands by substantial risk, harm, or serious harm. 
Giles Birchley argued that concepts of harm are as complex as those of best 
interests;(12) no less applied to a seriously ill child to whom innovative therapy, 
although unproven, offered a theoretical chance of improving his quality of life. The 
harms caused to a child by artificial ventilation do not change significantly over time, 
rather the benefits of continued ventilation do or the potential benefits of other 
treatment made possible by life-sustaining ventilation. Yet, significant harm is a 
threshold to be crossed not, like in determination of best interests, a balance of benefits 
and burdens. Furthermore, beyond harm to dignity the harms of artificial ventilation are 
arguably more significant to a child who can experience pain than one who cannot. As 
Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu have asked, how does assessment of 
significant harm apply to a child who may have been ‘beyond experience’ and thus 
unable to experience any pain or discomfort from intensive care? And, would it then 
be significant harm to keep him in intensive care and administer the therapy if that 
would mean the chances of the treatment having the effect his parents hope for is as 
a consequence reduced?(14)  
 
Further, as Giles Birchley observed, arguments of significant harm have connotations 
of substandard parenting which seem inappropriate in the context of disagreements 
between parents and professionals over what is best for a seriously ill child. In broad 
terms, a likelihood of significant harm is the threshold for the courts to exercise public 
law child protection powers with respect to children and it would be contrary to 
established law and policy to bring considerations of significant harm into either 
parental responsibilities or its own duties with respect to the treatment of seriously ill 
children. Dominic Wilkinson and Tara Nair rightly observed that the decision of the 
court to override the sincerely held views of parents about their child’s treatment will 
cause distress whether it is explained in terms of best interests or harm.(15) But, as 
Giles Birchley responded, using the language of best interests rather than harms is 
important in the public judgments of the court which relay messages to others beyond 
the parties to the case, in this context about the standards expected in the care of 
children.(16)  In response to the view of Charles Foster that a harm threshold serves 
as a hurdle to challenging parental decisions thus serving to protect parental decisions 
by setting the bar for intervention higher,(17) Birchley rightly observes that a threshold 
of significant harm for intervention in the decisions of parents suggests a society in 
which children are treated as objects of parental autonomy(18, 19) and not as 
individuals with rights worthy of protection (20) when law and policy are gradually 
giving recognition to the latter. Finally, he points out that communication between 
professionals and parents is vital to maintaining the relationship of trust upon which 
the shared care of children is delivered and the terms used can contribute to the 
breakdown in relationship which leaves referral to court as the only option. The legal 
argument amounted to a claim from Charlie’s parents that the treatment they wanted 
for him would not amount to significant harm, when in reality they were trying to secure 
for their son a chance of a better quality of life.   
 
                                                 
effect profile, which is being used in the best interests of a patient, often on an 
experimental and/or compassionate basis’(11). 
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State Intervention in the Exercise of Parental Responsibility: NHS Trusts and 
Courts    
GOSH was critical of Charlie’s parents claiming that they believed that ‘they alone have 
the right to decide what treatment Charlie has and does not have.’(21)  In contrast, his 
parents explained that they had fought for Charlie’s ‘right to receive appropriate 
medical treatment’ believing that they ‘ought to have been entrusted with the decision 
(as supported by scientific rationale and their international and world-renowned 
experts in mitochondrial disease) as to what was in their own child’s best interests’.xxii 
Their claim was thus based in the joint exercise of their parental responsibility to protect 
the right of their child to a viable alternative therapy. 
 
Charlie’s parents were right in the view that, except for the public law powers conferred 
by the Children Act 1989 upon local authorities, intervention by the state, in the form 
of an application by a public institution to court for a judge to make a decision about 
the best interests of their child, is otherwise unparalleled in family life.  The Children 
Act 1989 sets out the applicable principles when there are disagreements between 
parents, those with parental responsibility or otherwise involved in the day to day care 
and upbringing of children. This, of course, was not such a case, Charlie’s parents 
were united in their determination to secure for him the therapy they believed offered 
him a chance of a better quality of life.  
 
Further, the Act whilst giving public authorities powers to intervene into family life in 
the interests of child protection imposes clear and principled limits upon their exercise.  
The underpinning premise of the Act, as explained by the Law Commission whose 
review led to the Act, is that children are best raised by their parents, that public 
authorities should support parents to take responsibility for their children and only 
intervene compulsorily where the child is at risk of significant harm.(22) As Francis J 
observed in his second, July, judgment, ‘[t]o most like-minded people, a National 
Health Service trust is as much an arm of the state as is a local authority’. Furthermore, 
the judge said he could think of ‘few more profound cases’ than an application by an 
NHS Trust to have active treatment withdrawn from, and palliative care provided to, a 
child whose parents believe there is a therapy which offers a chance of improvement 
in his quality of life.xxiii  However, as Lady Hale stated when giving the reasons for 
refusing permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, ‘although a child can only be 
removed from home if it has been established that the child is likely to suffer significant 
harm, the significant harm requirement does not apply to hospitals asking for guidance 
as to what treatment is and is not in the best interests of their patients.(23) The hospital 
was entitled to ask a judge to decide about Charlie’s future medical treatment and the 
judge was entitled to do so.   
   
In Gard, McFarlane LJ observed that Baker J’s comment in King, quoted above, was 
made with respect to the actions of the public authorities – the local authority and police 
- when Ashya was removed by his parents from hospital without the knowledge of his 
doctors. His parents had acted according to their judgement of what was best for their 
child trying to secure post-operative treatment, following surgery to remove a malignant 
brain tumour, which they considered offered him the best possible chance with the 
fewest detrimental effects. However, Ashya had been removed from hospital care at a 
time when he urgently required post-operative treatment. Furthermore, he was fed by 
naso-gastric tube and those responsible for his medical care thought that his parents 
                                                 
xxii  Position statement on behalf of the parents, 24th & 25th July, [29], 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 
15/12/17].  
xxiii  Commenting upon the lack of legal aid in such cases and the pro bono representation 
of Charlie’s parents, Re Gard (A Child) [2017] EWHC 1909, [17].  
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had neither the equipment nor skills necessary to administer food to him. There were 
reasonable grounds for social workers to conclude that his parents’ actions placed him 
at risk of significant harm and for the application by the local authority for leave to apply 
for Ashya to be made a ward of court.xxiv   
 
McFarlane LJ explained that, in contrast to the limitations imposed upon local 
authorities by the Children Act, there is no threshold of significant harm in cases where 
the Trust refers to court disagreements about the medical treatment that is in the best 
interests of a child. There is ‘no statutory requirement for a hospital to go through the 
Section 100 loop.’xxv The other cases cited by Mr Gordon QC in support of his 
submission, Barnett and Re C, were also applications by the local authority which 
required leave of the court and not, as in Gard, an application by an NHS Trust with 
respect to a child in its care, which does not.(25, 26) There was much criticism, in the 
years preceding the Children Act, of the exercise by local authorities of their child 
protection powers, which can result in the supervision of parenting, or the temporary 
or permanent removal of a child from the family. In response, the Act imposed specific 
safeguards upon local authorities and the courts in the exercise of their public law 
powers. Despite Francis J’s observation that Trusts may seem to be an arm of the 
state, cases concerning the medical treatment of children are private, not public, law 
cases referred to court by a party with an interest in the welfare of a child, that is, on 
behalf of the clinicians with legal duties of care to the child. The alternative, to referring 
unresolved disagreements between parents and professionals to court, as had been 
argued in Royal Wolverhampton Hospital NHS Trust,(27) was that the medical 
treatment of a child is a matter of clinical judgement. Rather than let the opinion of 
parents or professionals, both concerned to secure what is best for the child but each 
unable to agree with the other, to prevail the court exercises its protective jurisdiction 
offering an independent judgement of the best interests of the child.      
 
Conclusion  
In his judgment, making the declarations sought by GOSH, Francis J set out the well-
established legal framework which he then applied to the facts before him. The Court 
of Appeal, Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights affirmed that there 
currently is no threshold before the court determines which of the treatment options is 
in the best interests of the child. The attempt to draw on the case of Ashya King to 
introduce a threshold of significant harm was fraught with difficulties and was 
emphatically rejected by the courts. The legal arguments raised important questions 
about the limits of state intervention into family life which were not best formulated in 
terms of significant harm but rather in terms of whether there was sufficient evidence 
that what the parents wanted was a viable clinical option which they or the court could 
select according to judgements of the best interests of the child. Whilst the parents of 
Ashya King wanted their child to have non-conventional treatment it was a recognised 
viable therapeutic option. Charlie’s parents worked tirelessly to secure the expert 
evidence they required to demonstrate that what they wanted for Charlie was a viable 
alternative treatment option.  That they may have been able to convince the court of 
this at a time when ‘due to the considerable delay in the commencement of treatment 
                                                 
xxiv  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964, [32], quoted by McFarlane LJ, In the 
Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [62].  
xxv  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [99]-[109]. Andrew Bainham has 
suggested that there is an argument for a threshold where the dispute is not between 
parents but between parents and another party, such as an NHS Trust although he 
does not suggest what that should be,(24). 
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that right and the window of opportunity has been lost for Charlie’xxvi was personally 
devastating.  One of Charlie’s legacies for future disputes may be that his case 
highlighted the need for evidence as to whether the treatment parents want for their 
child is a viable alternative therapeutic option before a court can determine which is in 
the best interests of the child. 
 
References 
1  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410. 
2  GOSH v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972. 
3  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964. 
4  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 179. 
5  LA v SB & AB & MB [2010] EWHC 1744. 
6  Re B (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1988] AC 199, 202, per Lord Hailsham. 
7  Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] Fam 33. 
8  Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242.  
9  Re Gard (A Child) [2017] EWHC 1909, [12]. 
10  Position statement on behalf of the parents, 24th & 25th July, 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/. 
11  Brierley J and Larcher V, ‘Compassionate and innovative treatments in children: a 
proposal for an ethical framework’ Arch Dis Child (2009) 94 651-654, 
http://nnpdf.org/files/2016/11/Compassionate-Use-in-Children.pdf. 
12  Birchley G, ‘Harm is all you need? Best interests and disputes about parental decision-
making’ J Med Ethics (2016) 42(2) 111-115. 
13  Diekema D, ‘Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold 
for State Intervention’ Theoretical Medicine (2004) 25 243-264, 250. 
14  Wilkinson D, Savulescu J, ‘Hard lessons: learning from the Charlie Gard case’ J Med 
Ethics Published Online First: 28 August 2017. doi:10.1136/ medethics-2017-104492.  
15  Wilkinson D, Nair T, ‘Harm isn’t all you need: parental discretion and medical decisions 
for a child’ J Med Ethics (2016) 42(2) 116–118. 
16  Birchley G, ‘The harm threshold and parents’ obligation to beneﬁt their children’ J Med 
Ethics (2016) 42(2) 123-126. 
17  Foster C, ‘Harm: as indeterminate as ‘best interests’, but useful for triage’ J Med Ethics 
(2016) 42(2) 121–122. 
18  Elliston S, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare, Routledge, 2007. 
19 Gillam L, ‘The zone of parental discretion: An ethical tool for dealing with disagreement 
between parents and doctors about medical treatment for a child’ Clinical Ethics (2016) 
11 1-8.   
20  Freeman M, ‘Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously’ International Journal of Law 
and the Family (1992) 6 52-71. 
21  GOSH’s position statement of the 13th July, [7], 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 
15/12/17]. 
22 Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No.172, 1988, 2.1.  
23  In the matter of Charlie Gard (Permission to Appeal Hearing), 8 June 2017, 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-hearing-in-the-matter-of-
charlie-gard.html [last accessed 15/12/17]. 
24 Bainham A, ‘Private and public children law: an under-explored relationship’ Child and 
Family Law Quarterly (2013) 25 138-158, 158. 
25  Barnett London Borough Council v AL [2017] EWHC 125 
26 Re C (Children) (Child in Care: Choice of forename) [2016] EWCA Civ 374. 
27  Royal Wolverhampton Hospital NHS Trust, unreported, 1999. 
                                                 
xxvi  Position statement on behalf of the parents, 24th & 25th July, [32], 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 
23/01/18]. 
